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Rwanda and the Difficult Business of Capitalist Development 
 
Graham Harrison 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article argues that current schisms in the research on post-genocide Rwanda are not sui 
generis but symptomatic of a broader set of separations within our understanding of 
development. Both the research on Rwanda and the most prominent intellectual responses to the 
rise of neoliberalism in development research have generated separations between a concern with 
rights and individual agency and structural transformation. The article sets out a way to reconcile 
key aspects of this separation and offers three empirical themes which provide original insights 
LQWR5ZDQGD¶VDSSDUHQWGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGSDUWLDOVXFFHVVLQSXVKLQJDKHDGZLWKDEROGVWUDWHJ\
of capitalist transformation. 
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RWANDA AND THE TENSION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Rwanda is perhaps the most commonly cited example of a supposed new African development. 
It is used as an exemplar ² for better or worse ² of a situation within which some African 
states have embraced developmental or transformative governance modes (Hickey, 2012) in 
which relatively high and sustained rates of economic growth are associated with state-driven 
strategies to transform their political economies. This article focuses on Rwanda as an especially 
important and revealing case to explore how these bolder post-neoliberal ambitions generate 
TXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHSODFHRIKXPDQULJKWVLQGHYHORSPHQW5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-genocide 
governance reminds us that politically contextualized understandings of development as a 
process of transformation do not easily conform to an idealized human rights framework. In the 
PLGVWRIWKLVUHFRJQLWLRQZHH[SORUHKRZ5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQWUDQVLWLRQVWUDWHJ\WULHVWREDODQFH
authoritarian state action with legitimacy claims based in transformatory outcomes.1 
 
 
Two Rwandas? 
 
It LVFRPPRQSODFHWRQRWHLQDGLVFXVVLRQRI5ZDQGD¶VSROLWLFVWKDWZULWLQJRQWKLVWRSLFLV
distinguished by its high levels of contention and, at times, quite different narrative presentations 
of the nature of change since the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took control of the state. Broadly, 
the difference might be characterized as between a narrative of decline and one of renaissance. 
7KHIRUPHUUHOLHVRQDQDUUDWLYHVWUXFWXUHLQZKLFK5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-genocide politics experienced 
a brief liberal possibility followed by a series of authoritarian measures, ratcheted one upon the 
other to produce a situation that is increasingly totalitarian and liable to generate a recrudescence 
of mass violence. The key metaphor here is a building up of pressure that will lead to a volcanic 
H[SORVLRQ7KHUHQDLVVDQFHQDUUDWLYHIRFXVHVRQµWKHJHQRFLGHDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VVXEVHTXHQWSRVW-
conflicWWUDQVLWLRQWRZDUGVLPSUHVVLYHHFRQRPLFJURZWKLQWKHODVWGHFDGH¶3HUNV
The key metaphor here is a sunrise, a rebirth, a prospective optimism.  
                                                 
1
 As argued DERYHµWUDQVIRUPDWRU\¶KHUHFRQQRWHVVRPHWKLQJVWUXFWXUDODQGEDVHGLQDPDFUR-economic 
political economy of change. There is another more rights-focused notion of transformation which 
connects to values of empowerment and participation. 
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This contrast is not unique to Rwanda but it is extreme if not exceptional.2 The force of argument 
can ² even within the moderating protocols of academic research rather than say, journalism or 
blog posts ² become polemic. If one could remove the name of the country from a number of 
representative research articles on Rwanda and then hand them to a reader, that reader might be 
forgiven for assuming the articles were about two different countries (Hintjens, 2014): one 
pushing forward towards a state of modernity and another on the verge of collapse. This 
JHQHUDWHVDVHQVHWKDWµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIDOPRst every aspect of Rwanda and its history are 
H[FHSWLRQDOO\SRODUL]HG¶%RRWKDQG*RORRED-Mutebi, 2012: 384; Ingelaere, 2014: 214; Jones, 
2012: 228).3 Whilst this polarization should not be exaggerated, it is certainly present; its 
significance derives both from its relative intensity compared with the academic scholarship on 
other East African countries and the fact that the polarization organizes around a single division 
between a sense of condemnation or support for the current government, both of which produce a 
FHUWDLQNLQGRIµEOLQGQHVV¶WRDIXOOHUSLFWXUH6W\V 
 
NeverthelessLWZRXOGEHDQH[DJJHUDWLRQVLPSO\WRDUJXHWKDWUHVHDUFKRQ5ZDQGD¶VSROLWLFVLV
bifurcated. With some exceptions that read as partial and polemic, the disagreements concerning 
5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-JHQRFLGHJRYHUQDQFHDFNQRZOHGJHRWKHUSRVLWLRQVDQGIDFHWVRI5ZDQGD¶V
politics but make analytical choices that marginalize those other positions. Of course, this is 
standard academic practice, a procedure to ensure some expositional and analytical clarity and to 
avoid simply being overwhelmed by the dense complexity of social reality. But, in this case, the 
degree of separation that does exist can make it difficult to address phenomena which are 
substantially interconnected. This is particularly true with regard to the politics of human rights 
and development. Studies of human rights and studies of development in Rwanda each make 
certain epistemic prioritizations that constrain them from understanding the inseparable nature of 
human rights and development in Rwanda (and arguably everywhere else).  Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the fact that both rights and development research are actually focusing 
their analysis on the same single political agency: the Government of Rwanda (GoR). 
                                                 
2
 For example, a similar kind of polemic often emerged after radical-nationalist revolutions in the post-
colonial world during the Cold War. An interesting recent treatment of one case is Pawson (2014).  
3
 Other researchers who acknowledge the specific contentiousness of Rwanda studies currently include 
Clark (2014); Perks (2013); Straus and Waldorf (2011).  
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Human Rights and Political Context 
 
6RPHZULWHUVIRFXVYHU\FHQWUDOO\RQ5ZDQGD¶VKXPDQULJKWVSROLWLFVDQGWKHLQVLJKWVWKDWWKH\
provide are extremely troubling. The leading scholar here is Filip Reyntjens who has, in fine 
detail, providHGDQDFFRXQWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI5ZDQGD¶VLQFUHPHQWDOWRWDOLWDULDQLVP 
(Reyntjens, 2013). There are numerous facets to this analysis: the shutting down of party 
political opposition, the disciplining of civil society, assassinations and threats, the domination of 
a core elite around the president, the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Prunier, 2009; 
Stearns, 2011), the authoritarian social engineering embedded within development policy 
(Ansoms, 2009), and the effective banning of public discussion of ethnicity. The human rights 
concern provides a stark analysis in which the Government of Rwanda has little to recommend it, 
and its mode of rule is likely to generate an explosion of violence ² which is where the 
previously-QRWHGµYROFDQR¶PHWDSKRUFRPHs from (Marijnen and van der Lijn, 2012: 24).  
 
However, it is not quite that straightforward. Whilst the human rights critique is often 
empirically valid and based in strong and highly consensual liberal premises concerning 
democracy and freedom, it is not immediately clear how one reconciles an a priori human rights 
concern with the construction of political authority in extremely adverse circumstances. To put it 
plainly, it is absurd to imagine that any post-genocide government could address the 
circumstances within which it was operating in a way that was entirely rights-congruent or based 
on an overarching process in which the construction of sovereignty and the expansion of human 
rights were coeval and positive-sum. These circumstances included: a profound collapse of state 
institutions; insurgencies and raids along borders; the resettlement of at least three million 
refugees and internally displaced people; DJHQHUDOL]HGVRFLDOWUDXPDLQWKHZDNHRIWKHZRUOG¶V
most intense genocide; an extreme lack of resources for government; and an impoverished 
economy. This being so, human rights critiques are both right and necessary, but also beg more 
proximate political questions about what constitutes a set of reasonable expectations with regard 
to governance. This is not an apology for authoritarian state actions; it is a necessary and difficult 
analytical step if one is going to treat human rights in a fully political fashion.  
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Let us offer some examples which might be collectively defined as the absence of convincing 
FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV7DNHIRUH[DPSOH5H\QWMHQV¶DXJXU\WKDWµWKH53)XQLODWHUDOO\LPSRVHGLWV
FRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHU¶DIWHUWKHJHQRFLGHVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVQRUPDWLYHO\SUHVHQWHGDVSDUW
of the ratcheting up of authoritarian governance, an imposition without the consent of the people. 
But, one might ask, what kind of politically contextualized counterfactual might one deploy to 
make this statement a concrete rather than idealized or abstract critique? The bare bones of the 
situation after the genocide was that the RPF seized control of a heavily depleted state that had 
both collapsed and created the infrastructure for a genocide. The country more broadly was in the 
midst of a series of profound traumas of which the genocide was in fact only the most terrible. 
Security and stability were major-order and immediate issues up until 1998 and then sporadically 
afterwards.4 In these political circumstances, what might one reasonably expect of any 
government? Is it not a fairly commonly accepted historical truism that post-conflict state-
EXLOGLQJLQYROYHVVRPHNLQGRIµXQLODWHUDOO\LPSRVHG« FRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHU¶"5  
 
There are other examples of human rights critiques which are abstractly pristine but concretely 
less easily rested on clear counterfactuals. The RPF provided limited access to power for 
opposition parties after the genocide and it has indeed incrementally marginalized other parties 
from power (Reyntjens, 2013: Ch. 1). But, after the genocide, surviving political parties had 
either been directly mobilizing the genocide or had been internally split and undermined as some 
OHDGHUVZHUHPXUGHUHGRWKHUVVLGHGPRUHRUOHVVZLOOLQJO\ZLWKWKHµ+XWXSRZHU¶WUDQVLWLRQDO
government that prosecuted the genocide, and some hid or went into exile. With such a 
compromised and weakened polity, what reasonable counterfactual might one pose to argue that 
the RPF excessively or prejudicially claimed power at the cost of opposition parties?  
 
Furthermore, although it is clear that the RPF has come to consolidate a monopoly of power over 
and within the state, making Rwanda substantially a single party state, this has taken place within 
a historic context in which the contestation of power between political parties has provoked 
                                                 
4
 Until 1998 there were frequent border raids by the rump of the genocidal army/militia from bases in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
5
 This is something readily accepted within the academic literature on post-conflict statebuilding. On 
Rwanda, see for example Samset (2011).  
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major challenges for state stability and social order (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014: S176). 
From 1959 onwards, multi-SDUW\LVPJHQHUDWHGDµSROLWLFDOHWKQLFLW\¶%HUPDQDQG/RQVGDOH
1991) that has reified ethnic identity, mobilized ethnic-party militias, and played a central part in 
creating periods of violence and displacement, some on a large scale (Ingelaere, 2009: 447; 
Kimonyo, 2016: 361 ff.; Longman, 2011: 32). The counterfactual, then, that after an emergency 
period the RPF should have opened up space for political opposition, is suggestive at best unless 
it in some fashion takes on board the historic fact that political party contestation of state power 
and the mobilization of ethnic constituencies are very closely inter-twined.  
 
One could take multiple e[DPSOHVWRPDNHWKHVDPHSRLQWWKDWDµSULVWLQH¶KXPDQULJKWVFULWLFDO
DQDO\VLVLVQHFHVVDU\EXWQRWLQLWVHOIIXOO\HTXLSSHGWRFDOLEUDWHDUHJLPH¶VSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHV
with context and history. This is an analytical point, not a normative one: it is about thinking 
WKURXJKPRGHVRIH[SODQDWLRQQRWDSRORJ\$VVXFKµFRQWH[W¶GRHVQRWVHUYHWRMXVWLI\KXPDQ
rights abuses but rather to assess authoritarian practice as a varied political phenomenon. Some 
forms of rights violations have different political meaning to others; some rights violations are 
squarely sui generis, produced directly to make some suffer or to instil fear; some kinds of rights 
violations are effected as a component of some larger government project. Taking the latter as a 
point of departXUHEULQJVXVVTXDUHO\WRWKHVSHFLILFDVSHFWRI5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-genocide 
governance that we will concentrate on in this article: its agricultural development strategy. 
 
 
Development and Consequentialism 
 
Starting with development rather than rights produces a striking contrast. There is a broad 
consensus that the GoR has achieved a remarkable amount of post-conflict development. This is 
something that is celebrated within aid consultancy reports and the global business and 
management literature, but it is also recognized in the critical academic literature as well 
(Ansoms, 2011: 241; Reyntjens, 2013: xvi). There is a large body of statistics that substantiate 
the claim that Rwanda has achieved a great deal of development on the basis of an extremely 
austere starting point and that it has sustained this well beyond any post-conflict recovery 
moment into something more closely resembling a social project, a permanent condition of 
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governance. Real GDP growth between 2001 and 2015 was 8 per cent per year. The government 
itself has set this out in broad aspirational terms in its Vision 2020 which ² unlike some other 
µYLVLRQGRFXPHQWV¶LQ$IULFD² is known by the majority of officials and taken seriously.  
 
The statistics clearly relate a narrative of economic growth, improved social provision, and a 
decrease in poverty. But, politically, exactly what they say is less obvious. The most prominent 
meaning in the presentation of statistics is to demonstrate progress through measurable outcomes 
(Davis et al., 2015; Fioramonti, 2014) and to make legitimacy claims on this basis, what Power 
LQVLJKWIXOO\FDOOVµULWXDOVRIYHULILFDWLRQ¶7KHUHLVDVHQVHLQZKLFKLQGHYHORSPHQW
programmes at least, success creates its own justification. At the level of national projects and 
programmes, the hitting or exceeding of targets and deadlines is the UDLVRQG¶HWUH for the project 
itself and, as a result, is difficult to criticize or condemn. Success is paradigmatic. This makes it 
possible to ignore, marginalize, or minimalize the effects that the project has not measured by a 
performance indicator or identified within a logical framework. It also allows this kind of 
mentality to ignore what one might loosely call popular agency: the statistics demonstrate the 
rightness of the strategy and the views of people are incidental. It is simply assumed that the 
µJRRGVWDWLVWLFV¶ZLOOFUHDWHUHDOOHJLWLPDF\DQGZHOO-being effects. This developmental episteme 
is now well known through studies of grandiose development projects such as damming and 
villagization but it is an equally valid concern for any kind of development endeavour. 
Analytically, this is a consequentialist understanding of development in which some combination 
of positivist metrics and a focus on the utility of achieved outcomes (measurable increase in 
income, output etc.) steers focus away from issues of rights and agency. 
 
In a Rwandan context, one can see the pertinence of this concern in the frequent use of James 
6FRWW¶s insightful concept of high modernism (Scott, 1999; cf. Van Damme et al., 2014), 
especially in the work that focuses on agricultural development. Successful development 
becomes social engineering (Hasselkog and Schierenbeck, 2015), a project not done for the 
benefit of the people but rather done to the people whether they like it or not. This perspective is 
based in the following core insights. First, that the Rwandan government neither understands nor 
values peasant ways of life and, as a result, wishes to transform them into something else 
(Ansoms, 2011). Second, that this transformation is based on a rather reified model of agrarian 
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modernity in which peasants are re-made through new technologies, the introduction of new 
crops, the reorganization (spatially and socially) of livelihoods, and a series of laws that prohibit 
anti-modern behaviour (Purdekova, 2012). Third, that this specific kind of transformatory vision 
requires authoritarian state practices: modernization is imposed upon peasants (Wyss, 2006). 
And finally, that this imposition generates resistance, conflict and resentment to such a degree 
that it is likely that the whole project will fail (Des Forges, 2006). 
 
,QWKLVVHQVHWKHFULWLFDOUHVHDUFKRQ5ZDQGD¶VDJULFXOWXUDOVWUDWHJ\ILWVZHOOZLWhin a broader 
WUDGLWLRQRIGHYHORSPHQWVWXGLHVLQZKLFKµKLJKPRGHUQ¶GHYHORSPHQWLVDXWKRULWDULDQULJKWV-
denying and prone to spectacular failure. In a second and more specific sense, this approach to 
5ZDQGD¶VDJULFXOWXUDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVWKHkey articulation between the work which 
prioritizes human rights concerns and the work which assesses development practices of the 
GoR. It is within the Rwandan countryside that we can best consider further how one might 
contextualize human rights with a concrete reality of a transformative development strategy; but 
first we must understand in a little more analytical detail what development transformation 
entails.  
 
 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION 
 
Conceptualizing Capitalist Transformation 
 
RwanGD¶VµYLVLRQ¶IROORZVDFHQWUDOWUDGLWLRQLQGHYHORSPHQWWKLQNLQJDQGVWUDWHJ\LQZKLFK
agrarian societies are the subject of a range of programmes that aim to promote industrialization 
and a transformation of agriculture towards commercialized and technology-intensive forms of 
production. At the heart of this kind of development thinking is profound and pervasive change 
across the board: in forms of production, social identities, modes of governance and spatial 
organization. Developmental transformations of this kind are very likely to be based in practices 
that are either indifferent to human rights or actively repress them. Practices of development are 
creators and destroyers of pROLWLFDOYDOXHV*RXOHW7KHPRUHµWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOLVW¶DQG
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ambitious the development project, the more likely it is to contain practices of top-down social 
engineering (Cowen and Shenton, 1996: 439 ff.).  
 
It is revealing that the bulk of rights-focused understandings of development are not 
transformatory in this sense, but rather incremental and based in an episteme that is person-
focused, based in studies of livelihoods and well-being (Alston and Robinson, 2005), 
interspersed with vignettes (Nussbaum, 2011),6 and a normative disposition towards the small 
FKDQJHVWKDWKDSSHQRUJDQLFDOO\IURPWKHLPSURYHPHQWLQSHRSOH¶VFDSDELOLWLHV1XVVEDXP
2011; Sen 1999). This approach to development is clearly more normatively appealing but less 
easily transformatory in our sense of the term.  
 
Research in the political economy of development has recently brought the notion of structural 
transformation back into some prominence in ways that connect with the distinction made above, 
and which connect with other traditions of analysis based in modelling the developmental state 
or industrialization.7 These approaches remind us that, within a historical-comparative framing, 
successful development has commonly involved authoritarian state practice, sustained over more 
than a generation: µDOOVRFLHWLHV¶WUDQVLWLRQVWRFDSLWDOLVPKDYHEHHQDFFRPSDQLHGE\DODUJH
GHJUHHRIYLROHQFH$IULFD¶VKLVWRU\KDVEHHQHVSHFLDOO\VR¶0RRUH 
 
Development transformations are always extremely politically demanding and indeed very risky. 
And, in all instances ² of success or failure ² we are talking about capitalist transformation. 
The corollary of adding this prefix is to focus on ways in which diverse processes of socio-
economic transformation are driven by accumulation ² profits generated through investment 
and the putting of people to work. The expanded accumulation of capital is not an easy process. 
It requires considerable power to put people to work; it requires strong state actions to reallocate 
property and maintain social order during periods of social turbulence and hardship; and it 
requires capitalist classes that are disciplined not simply to make money but to expand, upgrade, 
adapt, and of course make some kind of commitment to improve the well-being of the general 
population.  
                                                 
6
 Nussbaum deploys the life story of one woman (Vasinti) throughout her argument as illustration. 
7
 This work has focused around the research of -XVWLQ/LQ¶VQHZVWUXFWXUDOHFRQRPLFV$PHWLFXORXV
review and consideration of this notion is Fine and Van Waeyenberge (2013). 
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Capitalist development can be seen as the project to organize and discipline labour in the pursuit 
of expanded accumulation which improves general material well-being. It is necessary and 
important to recognize that in countries (like Rwanda) in which capitalism is very much present 
EXWQRWµXQLYHUVDO¶RUHVSHFLDOO\WUDQVIRUPDWLYHWKHUHDUHVRPHVLJQLILFDQWRWKHUIDFWRUVWREULQJ
in. There are important developmental issues concerning: the extent to which existing businesses 
are incentivized to invest in new technologies of production and seek various economies in scale, 
scope and space; the nature and intensity of the incorporation of diverse and complex livelihoods 
into the remit of capital and, vitally, the extent to which these incorporations generate 
improvements in material well-being; the allocation and enforcement of property regimes and 
their repercussions on social equality. Understandably, these major-order challenges have 
historically required a prominent role of the state. With a slight tweaking of the language, the 
challenges set out above can be associated with the kinds of programmes pursued by 
developmental states (Leftwich, 1995; Wade, 1990). These projects are in themselves strongly 
conditioned by the historical contexts within which they act (Doner et al., 2005; Kholi, 2004) and 
also by the dynamics embedded within the forging of relations between government and business 
groups (Chibber, 2006; Khan, 2010). 
 
One might note that this rather austere setting out of the basic business of capitalist development 
leaves little room for the normative desires to focus on the grassroots and rights expansion. The 
politics of capitalist development involve the allocation of suffering. Apart from the most 
determinedly liberal historiography, accounts of capitalist development are strongly 
characterized by processes which dispossess, alienate and disempower. Historically, this has also 
involved the heavy exploitation of peoples from other countries as well. It is a remarkable 
amnesia that many Western intellectuals construct frameworks of development which are 
declassé and premised on a consensual process of social change, as if the historic experiences of 
capitalist development in the developed world can be airbrushed away when they look 
elsewhere, a liberaOµPDNHRYHUIDQWDV\¶&UDPHU 
 
This framing is very relevant to our endeavour to integrate development and rights concerns into 
5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVWUDWHJ\,WKDVEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\DSSDUHQWLQWKH
11 
 
FRPSDUDWLYHUHVHDUFKRQµODWH¶GHYelopment that industrial transformations are based in 
associated agrarian transformations (Henley, 2015). There has, in an African context, emerged an 
extensive literature on the agrarian question, focussd on the dynamics generated by capitalist 
social relations in the countryside (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010; Bernstein, 1996). There is a fair 
amount of debate within this genre of research but also some common premises that in effect 
translate the broader understanding of capitalist development as, in part, a coercive and imposed 
transition into specific agrarian contexts. For example: the use of state institutions to extract 
surplus from peasants, the creation of landless or land-poor social groups within the peasantry, 
the dispossession of land, the emergence of diverse wage labour markets within agricultural 
production, and the expansion of large-scale commercial farming, all set within a core 
problematique about agricultural productivity (Byres, 1996).  
 
 
Capitalist Development, Human Rights, Social Movements 
 
We do not need to explore the specific meaning of the agrarian question in Rwandan agriculture 
here8 to note that ² as a specific component of the broader political economy of capitalist 
development ² it suggests that rights-affirming agrarian transitions are both historically 
extremely rare9 and analytically extremely difficult to specify.  
 
There are two important points that set a less optimistic but more historically contextualized 
approach to the role of popular politics in development. In the first place it must be recognized 
that capitalist development is not simply the dismal science of primitive accumulation or 
GLVSRVVHVVLRQ7KHUHPXVWEHVRPHIRUPRIJHQHUDOPDWHULDOLPSURYHPHQWLQSHRSOH¶VOives and 
VRPHNLQGRIµFRQWUDFW¶ZLWKLQZKLFKWKHULVLQJSRZHURIFDSLWDOLVOHJLWLPL]HGWKURXJKVRPH
form of national project of improved conditions of life. Otherwise, what is happening is not 
development. This is an important historical driver of capitalism: its insistent ambition to 
accumulate wealth and power and its necessary reconciliation with the demands of broader 
                                                 
8
 On this issue, see Harrison (2016). 
9
 2QHPLJKWZLVKWRQRWHWKDWWKHµRULJLQDO¶DJUDULDQWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQWKHJOREDO1RUWK were also 
SURWUDFWHGDQGFRHUFLYHDIIDLUVZKHWKHUIURPµDERYH¶RUµEHORZ¶%\HUV, 1996). See also Perelman 
(2000). 
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publics to commit to some form of social provision and accountability (Polanyi, 1944/2002). The 
outcomes of this interaction can be extremely varied. 
 
Second, capitalist development produces its own political agencies and contestations (Vogel, 
2006). This observation opens up a focus on popular and collective political agency that goes 
beyond the human rights episteme. Peasant movements have arisen in response to a variety of 
agrarian transformations driven by capital through land alienation, the restructuring of markets, 
DQGYDULRXVIRUPVRIµDGYHUVHLQFRUSRUDWLRQ¶LQWRFRPPRGLW\FKDLQV%Rrras and Edelman, 
2016). Rights within wage labour (which is, it should be stressed, a core component of agrarian 
change) emerge through struggles and organization within industries and sectors.  
 
The previous two points suggest that thinking about the political economy of capitalist transition 
maps a great deal better on to the literature on social movements than it does human rights. 
Social movements research explores popular agency not as an immanent property within the 
individual but as contextualized and specific assertions of collective political agency around 
contention (Tarrow, 1998) and collective identity (Gamson, 1995; Johnson and Klandermans, 
1995), focusing on the ways in which political agendas10 are constructed. Nothing in this 
approach precludes a concern about limited democratization or the suppression of human rights, 
but the meaning and importance derived from this can only be understood in relation to political 
mobilization.  
 
To summarize, I have suggested that capitalist development is a broad-ranging and profound 
social transformation that requires pervasive reorganizations of agrarian social relations, driven 
both by capital and political coercion. It is a risky and difficult enterprise. The pivotal issues in a 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIFDSLWDOLVWGHYHORSPHQW¶VSURVSHFWVDUHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK accumulation 
becomes transformatory, generating economies of scale, technological upgrades, the drawing in 
of more people into wage labour and the increases in productivity of labour that this might 
involve. The politics of this process are not easily rendered through notions of preternatural 
rights and empowerment; more useful are the relatively novel forms of collective resistance and 
                                                 
10
 The social movement nomenclature here is of diagnostic and prognostic framing; see Snow and 
Benford (1992). 
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agency that are ushered in as societies change. The argument that we derive from this rendering 
of development is that specific cases of development are best understood as normatively 
agonistic cohabitations of authoritarian and coercive action that are embedded within projects of 
social transformation that have as their core justification, and even legitimation, the prospect 
(more or less realistic) of an expanding and transforming economy that will make general 
LPSURYHPHQWVWRSHRSOH¶VOLYHV0DNLQJWKLVVWHSDOORZVXVWRUHWXUQWR5ZDQGDZLWKDVHQVHRI
FRQWH[WDQGDQDO\WLFDOQXDQFHLQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWRS-GRZQ¶DJrarian transition. 
 
 
5:$1'$¶6&$3,7$/,67AGRARIAN TRANSITION STRATEGY 
 
5ZDQGD¶VAgrarian Context  
 
$JULFXOWXUHPDWWHUVDJUHDWGHDOIRU5ZDQGD,WLVDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶V
livelihood: 72 per cent of Rwandans have an agricultural base11 to their livelihood (Abbott et al., 
*HRJUDSKLFDOO\RXWVLGH.LJDOL5ZDQGD¶VVRFLDOODQGVFDSHLVRQHRIKRPHVWHDGVDQG
villages set in densely-farmed hilly fields. Agriculture employs almost 90 per cent RI5ZDQGD¶V
active working population and represents about 45 per cent of its GDP (Ansoms, 2008: 2).12 
RXUDOVRFLHW\LQ5ZDQGDLVSHUFHLYHGDVWKHKHDUWRIµWUDGLWLRQDO¶VRFLDOLGHQWLWLHV9HUZLPS
2013); it is DOVRWKHORFDWLRQIRUPRVWRI5ZDQGD¶VH[WUHPHDQGFKURQLFSRYHUW\LWLVHVWLPDWHG
that over 70 SHUFHQWRIWKHUXUDOSRSXODWLRQDUHµIRRGSRRU¶9LQFN 1) and poverty rates in 
rural areas are twice as high as in urban areas (African Development Bank, 2013: 12). Rwanda is 
a land-scarce country: there is very little unused land and average landholdings are reported to be 
very low ² between 0.75 ha (Diao et al., 2010: 20) and 0.33 ha per household (World Bank, 
2014: 3) depending on source. There has always been an anxiety amongst Rwandan governments 
and development researchers that increasing land scarcity will exacerbate contestations over land 
tenure and access, and there is some evidence that land scarcity and inequality were factors in 
                                                 
11
 Note the phrasing here. I do not wish to imply that Rwanda is a nation of self-sufficient subsistence 
farmers. As with the rest of Africa, Rwandan peasantries reproduce themselves through small-scale 
production, trade and wage employment (formal and informal). See Jefremovas (2002) for a detailed case 
study. 
12
 There is some variation in the estimates of people living primarily from agriculture, but they all 
GHPRQVWUDWH5ZDQGD¶VVWURQJEDVHLQIDUPLQJDFFRPSDQLHGE\DVORZGHFOLQHLQLWVUHODWLYHVKDUHRI*'3 
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provoking the genocide (Andre and Platteau, 1998; Des Forges, 2006: 354; Van Hoyweghen, 
1999: 353±4). Rural population density is extremely high (Sennoga and Byamukama, 2014: 13). 
Climatic unpredictability leaves Rwandan smallholder agriculture (and agriculture in general) 
VXEMHFWHGWRSURGXFWLYLW\GHFOLQHVDQGIUHTXHQWµKXQJHU\HDUV¶$JULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWLVD
major development concern.  
 
In the first ten years after the genocide, the GoR did not have a clear agricultural development 
strategy. This was primarily because its major concerns were with the re-establishment of state 
authority throughout the territory and managing the return of millions of people from internal 
displacement and international refuge. These things the government achieved with remarkable 
success, eventually backed by donor support. Connected to these two objectives of re-
establishing a state presence and resettlement, the government and donors rolled out a diverse set 
RIZKDWRQHPLJKWFDOOµRUGLQDU\¶DJULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVQXWULWion initiatives, the 
provision of cows, NGO-funded projects on specific villages and districts.  
From 2000, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Vision 2020, and the formal ending of the 
insurgencies and DRC border incursions in the north, led the government to allocate large 
SRUWLRQVRILWVEXGJHWWRWKHSURYLVLRQRIEDVLFKHDOWKFDUHDQGHGXFDWLRQWKURXJKRXW5ZDQGD¶V
rural landscape. This was a period in which Rwanda moved from a series of state-building, 
reconstruction and emergency response measures to a more systemic, ambitious and 
transformatory development strategy. The strategy itself was not strongly based in agriculture, 
but rather in WKHLGHDORIEHFRPLQJDVHUYLFHWUDQVSRUWDQGLQIRUPDWLRQµKXE¶.LPDQXND
In 2001, the government introduced the Rural Sector Support Programme but it did not receive 
strong political backing.  
 
In 2003 ² crucially as a result of adverse climatic conditions and their impact on agriculture ² 
5ZDQGD¶V*1,JURZWKGLSSHG)XUWKHUPRUHLQWKHPLG-2000s, it became FOHDUWKDW5ZDQGD¶V
growth was not addressing poverty and inequality very effectively and that rural poverty had 
remained largely unaffected by growth, something that started to affect donor attitudes towards 
Rwanda. It was in this political and economic context that the GoR rolled out the first of three 
Strategic Programmes for the Transformation of Agriculture (PSTA) in 2004. From 2004, and 
especially from 2007 when the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) commenced, agriculture 
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came to occupy a central place in the gRYHUQPHQW¶VVWUDWHJLFWKLQNLQJDERXWGHYHORSPHQW
something reflected in the gRYHUQPHQW¶VILUVW(FRQRPLF'HYHORSPHQWDQG3RYHUW\5HGXFWLRQ
Strategy in 2007.  
 
Agricultural production doubled from 2000 to 2012, with most of this increase taking place 
within the third phase outlined above (World Bank, 2015: vi). It is clearly the case that 
agricultural development has the statistical narrative of outcome-based success and legitimacy. 
In what ways and to what degree might we consider this success to be evidence not only of 
growth but also of transformation? 
 
 
From Agricultural Development to Agrarian Transformation 
 
The GoR does not only want to improve the well-being of people in rural areas; it also wants to 
transform rural society in a systemic fashion. Rural development in Rwanda is agrarian 
transformation, a change in the social relations of peasant production. It involves changes to the 
technologies of production, their spatial organization, their modes of articulation with other 
economic agents, and their knowledge or habits of thinking.  
 
There is a distinction worth making here between agricultural development and agrarian 
transformation. The former is characterized by projects in a range of livelihood aspects: 
irrigation schemes, the introduction of new materials (tools, livestock, seeds), the provision of 
social infrastructure (feeder roads, wells, schools, health posts), and extension services (training, 
SLORWRUGHPRQVWUDWLRQILHOGVWKHPRQLWRULQJDQGµFRUUHFWLRQ¶RIIDUPLQJWHFKQLTXHV7KHODWWHU
is a strategic integration of all of these facets (and possibly others) into a politically and 
institutionally driven medium-term state practice, the overall aim being not only the 
improvement in discrete development indicators but the realization of a different agricultural 
society. It is the argument of this article that Rwanda is experiencing the beginnings of the latter. 
The PSTA is currently in its third iteration which will run to 2018. The PSTA is a broad 
encompassing document that aligns a set of actions and agencies to realize a certain vision for 
5ZDQGD¶VDJULFXOWXUH$WWKHKHDUWRIWKLVYLVLRQLVWKH&,P which aims to generalize the 
16 
 
production of six key crops and maximize productivity, allocating specialisms in these crops to 
different regions, promoting the use of improved seeds and chemical fertilizers. Production 
responses in these six crops has been YHU\SRVLWLYHµWKHWRWDOSURGXFWLRQRIPDL]HZKHDWDQG
cassava tripled from 2007 to 2011, the production of beans doubled, and that of rice and Irish 
SRWDWRLQFUHDVHGE\SHUFHQW¶*RORRED-Mutebi, 2013: 3; IFAD, 2013: ). More recently, the 
World bank stated WKDWµEHWZHHQDQG\LHOGVLQFUHDVHGSHUFHQWIRUPDL]H
percent for wheat, 90 percent for cassava, 66 percent for potatoes, 62 percent for bananas, and 34 
SHUFHQWIRUULFH¶:RUOG%DQNYL1DWLRQDODYHUDJHIHUWLOLzer use was raised from 6 kg/ha 
per annum in 2006 to 30 kg/ha in 2010 (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014: S184). 
 
Additionally, the PSTA includes irrigation, erosion control and wetland reclamation. It is driven 
by the Ministry of Agriculture which has, since about 2007, become a more active, donor-
connected and well-resourced ministry. It also includes a set of government specialized agencies: 
the Rwanda Agricultural Board, the National Agricultural Export Board and the Rwanda 
Cooperative Agency. Each of these agencies has a functional specialism which closely intersects 
with the PSTA, respectively to provide improved production technologies and extension 
services, to promote and market agricultural exports, and to support the formation of producer 
cooperatives. The Ministry of Lands has carried out a full cadastral survey of tenure and 
promoted villagization well beyond its original function of providing shelter to returnees. From 
2006, the Office of the President has cascaded performance contracts down to the District levels 
(and often beyond),13 the core of which is often a set of agricultural output targets. The Rwanda 
Development Board has as one of its key strategic aims the promotion of private sector 
investment in agriculture, either in the form of private commercial farms or as suppliers of 
services to peasant cooperatives. All of this is also integrated into the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and enjoys strong backing from donors who 
were largely indifferent to agriculture until around 2007 (Golooba-Mutebi, 2013).  
 
                                                 
13
 From 2012, there has been a declaration to implement household-level imihigo, the neo-traditional 
name for performance contracts. 
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In interviews14 ZLWKWKRVHSURVHFXWLQJ5ZDQGD¶VDJULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWQR-one was in any 
doubt that agricultural transformation as set out in the PSTA and CIP constituted a single 
integrated and politically backed programme of transformation. There was no critical 
commentary from donors (as there often is)15 FRQFHUQLQJDODFNRIµSROLWLFDOZLOO¶FRRUGLQDWLRQ
RUSDWURQDJH*RYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVZHUHDOOHQWLUHO\IRFXVHGRQWKHµYLVLRQ¶DQGWKHLUUROHLQLW
providing detailed reflections on target achievement (something of an institutional cultural 
obsession in Rwanda) and aspirations to improve. At the centre, there is an elite ² governmental 
and international ² with a strong shared vision, institutionally coordinated, well-resourced and 
scientifically specialized, that wants to see a transformation of Rwandan agriculture. We might 
ask: why has this transformatory vision arisen? 
 
 
The Political Drivers of Agrarian Transformation 
 
7KHUHDUHWKUHHVDOLHQWSROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQVIRU5ZDQGD¶VGHWHUPLQHGDJUDULDQ
developmentalism. In the first place, we should recognize that the core of the government is 
staffed by a group within the RPF who grew up in Uganda and returned through military action 
against the then incumbent Rwandan government. Closely connected, there are many Rwandans 
who have returned from Europe and North America into middle- and high-ranking positions 
within the ministries (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012: 392; Van Hoyweghen, 1999: 365). Both 
groups see in Rwanda a country that they have returned to, and which they desire to re-make in 
their own image. These two groups16 KDYHQRWJURZQXSDPLGVW5ZDQGD¶VµWKRXVDQGKLOOV¶DQG
they draw their political values from a more diffuse pool of ideas than those that prevail in 
5ZDQGD¶VYLOODJHVDQGVPDOOWRZQV$QVRPV±5; Des Forges, 2006: 359). Government 
programmes have been articulated through neo-traditional rural symbols ² umuganda, gacaca, 
                                                 
14
 Twenty-nine interviews with leading government personnel, donor representatives, multilateral 
organizations and directors of agribusinesses, carried out in 2014 and 2015. 
15
 Having carried out interviews with donors on various aspects of development policy in East Africa, 
what makes Rwanda distinct is that donor spokespeople do not take some time either in interview or off 
the record to set out their experiences of dysfunction, corruption, or exasperation concerning the 
government.  
16
 7KHµ8JDQGDQ¶DQGµGLDVSRULF¶JURXSVPLJKWZRUNLQXQHDV\FRH[LVWHQFH0\RZQDQGRWKHUV¶
interviews with diaspora civil servants suggest both some admiration for KDJDPH¶VIRUFHIXOQHVVRI
purpose and some fear. 
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abunzi, ubudehe (Clark, 2014)17 ² but these are revealing not only for their attempts to render 
policy in culturally vernacular terms and in reference to a longer history of Rwandan 
nationhood,18 but also in their purpose which is to fit within a strongly transformational and 
modernizing project (Rwiyereka, 2014).19 
 
If there is a µFRUH¶HOLWHZLWKLQWKH5ZDQGDQVWDWHWKDWVKDUHVH[SHULHQFHVRIreturn and a sense of 
alienation from Rwandan everyday life, this might give an insight into the desires to change 
Rwanda without strong attention to what already exists. But ² and this is the second point ² 
WKHUHLVDOVRVRPHWKLQJHOVHLQWKHµPRGHRIUH-HQWU\¶LQWR5ZDQGDWKDWPDWWHUVa great deal. The 
core of the ruling elite gained power in the throes of a genocide and civil war. Although the post-
1994 government was multi-ethnic and the PRF strongly eschews ethnic politics, the core of 
government was largely made up of ethnic Tutsi, and they faced a country traumatized by 
violence and politically mobilized ethnic politics (Van Hoyweghen, 1999: 372). Few 
governments come to power in such insecure circumstances.20 It is difficult to imagine how these 
returning or immigrant groups at the heart of government would easily live in Rwanda without 
control of the state: it is the construction of statehood that defines this group and its place in 
5ZDQGD7KHKLVWRULFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-genocide government are that it is 
staffed by a core elite that identifies extremely strongly with the state (Marijnen and van der 
Lijn, 2012: 17) and understands very well that its control of the state depends on its ability to 
assert and justify its rule to a rural population that is both traumatized and in some degree alien 
(Chemouni, 2014). 
 
The general response to these specific circumstances is that the Rwandan government has 
pursued a consistent and determined project of national development. One can see constantly in 
Rwandan media coverage of KaJDPH¶VYLVLWVWKURXJKRXWWKHFRXQWU\WKHVDPHPHVVDJHWKLV
                                                 
17
 5HVSHFWLYHO\FRPLQJWRJHWKHUIRUDFRPPRQSXUSRVHJUDVVURRWV¶WUDGLWLRQDO¶FRXUWVPHGLDWLRQPXWXDO
support. 
18
 5ZDQGD¶VQDWLRQDOKLVWRU\LV² like many nationalisms ² more recent and problematic than is often 
portrayed; see Des Forges (2011); Newbury (1988). The notion of a long-standing national unity provides 
a vital resource for those who wish to move away from the erroneous notion that Rwanda has endured 
IL[HGDQWLSDWKLHVEHWZHHQµ7XWVLV¶DQGµ+XWXV¶ 
19
 This is most clearly the case in respect to imihigo which has effectively become a universalized 
performance contracting system (Chemouni, 2014). 
20
 Taiwan and Israel come to mind. 
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JRYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLWLPDF\VKRXOGEHWHVWHGE\LWVDELOLW\WRGHOLYHUGHYHORSPHQW'HYHORSPHQW
OHJLWLPDF\LVWKHNH\WRWKHFXUUHQWFRUHHOLWH¶VVHFXULW\/RQJPDQ7KHFRUROODU\RI
this is that the pursuit of development is not based in rights and capabilities expansion but rather 
two other political values: a demonstration of the state¶s ability to act in an authoritative way ² 
to get things done ² and to generate results through resource inputs and modes of mobilization. 
 
2QHFDQVHHWKHVHWZRYDOXHVLQDOODVSHFWVRI5ZDQGD¶VGHYHORSPHQWSUDFWLFH7KHSHUYDVLYH
performance culture instilled within the state and rolled out into society is accompanied by a 
constant setting of ambitious targets. Within sectoral policy, the government invests capital in 
projects and programmes with strong political discipline and a focus on efficacy. One can see 
this in road construction, irrigation schemes, the development of industrial parks, its investment 
LQZLUHOHVVLQWHUQHWWHFKQRORJ\DQGLQDUDQJHRIPRUHµPLFUR¶LQWHUYHQWLRQVVXFKDVWKHEDQQLQJ
of plastic bags. Rwanda is often identified as an exemplary case of effective health provision 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). There is also a raft of evidence that corruption within government is 
minimal. The argument here is that, whatever the intrinsic value governing elites put on 
development as a good in itself, there is a strong extrinsic motivation to maintain a state that has 
DVLWVµEDVLFOHJLWLPDWLRQGHPDQG¶Williams, 2007) order through development. This is the key 
to post-genocide sovereignty.  
 
There is a third core component that reinforces the political motivations behind developmental 
governance in Rwanda. The reliance on developmental legitimacy is thoroughly intertwined with 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VQDWLRQDOLVWGLVFRXUVH7KLVLVQRWRQO\DQRWKHULQVWDQWLDWLRQRIWKHJHQHULFSRVW-
colonial phenomenon of national development as a tool to promote unity under state sovereignty. 
,WLVDOVRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPDLQZD\to address the legacy of genocide. Understandably, the 
government aims to restrict public expressions of ethnic politics. Against ethnicized political 
discourses, the government propounds a strong discourse of Rwandan unity that poses a national 
identity above an ethnic one (Purdekova, 2012). This is, like the claims to developmental 
legitimacy, a message repeated constantly by politicians. It is articulated through a 
historiography in which ethnic difference was constructed by colonial power and exacerbated by 
previous Rwandan governments, especially the Habyarimana regime, the rump of which was the 
core agency behind the genocide. The counterpart to a public repression of political ethnicity is a 
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positive proposing of a national identity not only based in µ5ZDQGDQ-QHVV¶EXWDOVRLQQDWLRQDO
development. A key purpose of development as social transformation is not only to create 
µPRGHUQ¶5ZDQGDQV21 but also to create social identities within which ethnicity is less prominent 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2013: 5). In short, development is a political project that aims to construct and 
enforce social identities that are less liable to generate political violence in the future: 
µGHYHORSPHQWIRUSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\¶Van Hoyweghen ,1999: 365). A great deal of this state 
project is oriented towards rural society (Ingelaere, 2014; Purdekova, 2011). 
 
 
Agrarian Transformation from Above 
 
7KHVHSROLWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVXQGHUSLQWKH*R5¶VSURVHFXWLRQRIZKDWZHKDYHDOUHDG\LGHQWLILHG
as an integrated and ambitious state-driven agrarian transition. In this section, we identify two 
aspects of this project which most clearly connect to the authoritarian facets that this situation 
generates. In each case, we can see the interplay of authoritative state action and development 
ambition which contains both a coercive aspect and a design to transform the countryside in 
ZD\VWKDWDLPWRJHQHUDWHLPSURYHPHQWVLQSHRSOH¶VZHOO-being.  
 
In the first place, there is a socio-spatial reordering of rural society through villagization and 
cooperativization. This takes place not on the back of a stable pre-existing social milieu but 
rather after a series of massive socio-spatial disruptions (Newbury, 2005). It is based in a 
universal cadastral and land registration process that has re-inscribed RwandD¶VODQGWHQXUH
relations into private freehold (Pritchard, 2013). It is also based in a (related) process of 
villagization (imidugudu) that aims ² as with many villagization programmes ² to concentrate 
people in order to more effectively provide public services and to lock people into a political 
order (Ingelaere, 2014; Leegwater, 2011). Villagization is accompanied by the Land Use 
Consolidation Programme which establishes single crop specialisms for different regions. 
                                                 
21
 The quotation marks here simply signal that it is easy to produce stark oppositions between 
µLQGLJHQRXV¶DQGµWUDGLWLRQDO¶LGHQWLWLHVLQZD\VWKDWHVVHQWLDOize and reify what are heuristic terms that 
extract facets of social identities that often display more flexibility and hybridity than these terms allow. 
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In comparison with other villagizations in the region (Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique in the 
VDQGVWKHSURFHVVKDVEHHQJUDGXDODQGPRUHµLQFHQWLYL]HG¶WKDQmerely coercive.22 
Villagization was accompanied by two connected strategic goals of government: the 
reorganization of land in order to deal with the increasing pressure on land and its fragmentation 
(Musahara and Huggins, 2005: 326); and the gRYHUQPHQW¶VGHVLJQWRFUHDWHDJULFXOWXUDO]RQHV
throughout the country, each of which is assigned a certain set of crop specialisms. 
 
In all three comparison cases from the 1970s, the military evacuated people from settlements and 
sometimes burned old settlements and trees to stop people returning. In Rwanda, it would be a 
stretch to claim that all villagization has been participatory, and there have been instances of the 
GHVWUXFWLRQRIKRXVHV'HV)RUJHVDQGDJHQHUDOL]HGVWURQJDQGµWKUHDWHQLQJ¶
government instruction to move to villages (HRW, 2001) but this has not led to large-scale 
systematic forced relocation.  
 
Reading the rights-based research on villagization, one would be forgiven for thinking that 
5ZDQGD¶VUXUDOSRSXODWLRQKDGEHHQHQWLUHO\UHDOORFDWHGLQWRimidugudu villages forcibly by the 
state; this is not the case (Hitayezu et al., 2014: 458; Isaksson, 2013: 405; Van Hoyweghen 1999: 
363). However, the gRYHUQPHQW¶V9LVLRQLVEDVHGRQDWUDQVLWLRQWRZDUGVXQLYHUVDO
villagization and it is prohibited to construct new houses outside the imidugudu (Musahara and 
Huggins, 2005: 326). In sum, the government relies upon some coercion and a strong directive to 
move people into communal villages and this has produced a regionally-varied but incremental 
shift in settlement patterns. This is not a participatory process; nor is it systemic forced 
relocation. It is, however, based on a broader strategy to transform the countryside. In 2015 
about half the rural population were living in imidugudu villages (Sennoga and Diabate, 2015: 
1). 
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 Van Leeuwen (2001) has argued that there are substantive similarities. However, the evidence he 
presents actually suggests that while the similarities are certainly present, they do not demonstrate the 
kind or scale of systemic coercion that took place in the three comparators. This is not to downplay or 
trivialize the coercion that is present but it is to maintain an empirical distinction between Rwanda and 
other national villagization programmes. 
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Villagization is accompanied by a strong push to develop agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives 
can take different forms: they vary considerably in size, modes of arrangement for the pooling of 
resources, trading relations, forms of governance, and function. What they have in common is a 
more generalized developmental purpose. In a society characterized by land-scarce smallholding, 
often with tiny dispersed areas of land, the identification of an agent of capitalist development is 
difficult. Although there is plenty of research showing that Rwandan peasants are knowledgeable 
farmers who maintain different plots of land to cope with seasonal uncertainties, intercropping in 
sophisticated ways and embedding their productive lives in rich cultures of sociability (de Lame, 
2005; Van Damme et al., 2014; Van Hoyweghen, 1999: 355), there is far less evidence of how 
peasant farming in Rwanda can serve as the basis for capitalist development beyond the most 
JUDGXDOLVWDQGµRUJDQLF¶SHUVSHFWLYHVZKLFKPLJKWZRUNWKHPVHOYHVWKURXJKRYHUDFRXSOHRI
generations.  
 
Having effectively defined the peasant household out of the developmental vision, cooperatives 
are the gRYHUQPHQW¶VSULQFLSDODWWHPSWWRLGHQWLI\FRQVWUXFWDGHYHORSPHQWDODJHQWLQWKH
countryside. By conceptualizing peasants as parts of ordered cooperatives, the government can 
SURYLGHVXSSRUWDQGUHJXODWLRQLQZD\VWKDWUHFRQVWUXFWSHDVDQWIDUPHUVDVDNLQGRIµFRUSRUDWH
DJULFXOWXUDOHQWUHSUHQHXU¶7KHFRRSHUDWLYHIRUPUH-imagines smallholders as components in an 
organization that not only institutionalizes indiviGXDOIDUPHUV¶ODERXULQWRVRPHIRUPRI
corporate collectivity, but also enables the reframing of peasants as participants in an advantage- 
and opportunity-VHHNLQJPDUNHWDJHQF\µUHGXFLQJWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVLQLQSXWDQGRXWSXWPDUNHWV
and improving bargaining power vis-à-YLVEX\HUV¶9HUKRIVWDGWDQG0DHUWHQV,QVSLWH
of organizational diversities, all cooperatives are registered with the government (through the 
Rwanda Cooperatives Agency DQGDOOKDYHWRKDYHDµEXVLQHVVSODQ¶ZKLFKLVEDVHGRQLQFreased 
production of cash crops. The government provides resources to cooperatives through subsidized 
fertilizer provision, extension services, and a range of promotions for the retailing of its 
production. It also facilitates and enforces contracts between cooperatives and other agencies, 
perhaps most notably in the production contracts cooperatives sign with agribusinesses. 
Cooperatives are also identified as the main way to provide credit to Rwandan farmers in very 
23 
 
thin financial markets (Ayalew et al., 2014: 650).23 The aim of the government is to transform 
5ZDQGD¶VUXUDOVRFLHWLHVLQWRDSDWFKZRUNRIFRRSHUDWLYHVHDFKDFWLQJµHQWUHSUHQHXULDOO\¶LQWKH
sense that they are incentivized and disciplined by investment plans, output targets and 
increasingly dense connections to other market agents.  
 
This EULQJVXVWRWKHVHFRQGFRUHIDFHWRI5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJ\DJULFXOWXUDO
chain development. The government relies heavily on the chain development metaphor; it 
enables a certain cognitive maSRI5ZDQGD¶VVPDOOKROGHUVDQGWKHLUSODFHLQDEURDGHUFDSLWDOLVW
transition, and it is premised on the expansion and eventual universalization of the cooperative. 
There are two main aspects to chain development. First, chain integration connotes the 
construction of more diverse and stronger connections between farmers and other market agents. 
It is understood that peasant farmers have some linkages to traders and suppliers but that these 
linkages have been limited and sporadic, and have disadvantaged smallholders. The government 
vision is of a peasantry that has manifold, reliable and robust connections to many other agencies 
within rural political economies. The government has encouraged an expansion in agrarian 
marketing and input supply within the private sector. It has provided support for microcredit 
mechanisms. With regard to cooperatives specifically, the whole constitution of the cooperative 
is based on the contracting of services and supplies from other agents. This might commonly 
involve supplies of fertilizer, seeds and credit (secured against a contract to supply produce). 
Cooperatives are also encouraged to agree supply contracts with traders and agribusinesses 
(Huggins, 2014: 372). All cooperatives have to have a business plan which is centrally about the 
setting of contract relations with other market agencies. 
 
In the second place, chain integration is connected to a process of upgrading. Chain upgrading 
involves implementing the production of new and improved crops, moving into processing. Most 
well-known in this respect is the increasing number of coffee washing stations from two in 2001 
to over 100 in 2007 (Murekezi et al., 2012) and in some cooperatives the establishing of 
marketing and branding activities (in tea and coffee). The governmHQW¶VSURJUDPPDWLFIRFXV
here is the Crop Intensification Programme which has provided improved and subsidized inputs, 
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 The gRYHUQPHQW¶V6DYLQJVDQG&UHGLW&RRSHUDWLYHV6$&&2DUHWKHPDLQIRFXVRIDWWHPSWVWRSURYLGH
credit to those with limited capital and collateral. 
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extension services, investment in post-harvest storage, and the selection of key crops for 
productivity increases.24 Through CIP and a range of other projects and programmes,25 
cooperatives and smallholders are, it is expected, socialized into an µHQWUHSUHQHXULDO¶PLQGVHWLQ
which production is driven by the pursuit of new opportunities through deeper market-based 
networking. CIP has also pushed farmers to monocrop, fitting with the land consolidation, 
cooperativization and villagization programmes mentioned above.  
 
In summary, the Rwandan government has a coherent model of agrarian capitalist development 
that is based on a state-driven reordering of rural space and the organizational form of production 
+XJJLQV7KLVVWUDWHJ\LVµGHVLJQHGWRPRYHWKHVHFWRUWRZDUGVDPRGHUQPDUNHW
orientation, with farmers integrated into value chains and increased agro-processing¶ (Abbott et 
al., 2015: 923). These aims have been pursued with considerable purpose and with resource 
inputs and they have generated a strong production response.26 It would be a stretch to claim that 
any of this has been participatory, although the processes underlying these changes are formally 
voluntary. As already stated (and to pre-empt accusations that this analysis is a straightforward 
defence or apology for the RPF which, as the first section suggests, is a real risk in Rwandan 
studies) this is not an argument that 5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQGHYHORSPHQWKDVZRUNHGRUWKDWLWLVWR
be entirely celebrated. There is good theory and evidence to suggest that this model generates 
forms of impoverishment within transition (Ansoms, 2008). But, it is to say that this is what 
capitalist development looks like. If one wishes to maintain strong criticisms of the RPF, then 
one needs to identify other realistic development strategies or relinquish a focus on development 
and, in the process, de-emphasize concerns with material poverty or social transformations that 
possibly generate general improvements in social well-being. 
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 Maize, wheat, cassava, beans, potatoes and rice. 
25
 These involve donors and the Rwanda Cooperative Agency. 
26
 Government expenditure on agriculture is difficult to clarify. Some data suggest that it has steadily 
increased and is now over 10 per cent of government expenditure (IFAD, 2013: 2). An authoritative 
overview suggests that the trend in public expenditure on agriculture has been rather bumpy but that it is 
now close to 10 per cent (Booth and Golooba-0XWHEL7KHµUHDOLW\¶RIDJULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWDV
a state-driven project is perhaps best understood in terms of the resources dedicated by government and 
donors who have established an increasingly strong intersubjectivity regarding agricultural strategy; this 
is something that has been facilitated by the language of agricultural chains. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In his detailed and rigorous treatment of the agrarian origins of capitalism in Germany and 
America, Terry Byers emphasizes the importance of class struggle, differentiation and the social 
relations of accumulation. He argues that these are at the heart of any agrarian transformation 
towards a sustained and dynamic capitalism, but that they suggest that development is neither 
quick nor clean (Byers, 1996: 420). This perspective both fits with the argument in this article 
and seems very pertinent for Rwanda.  
 
Rwandan agriculture is undergoing an impressive period of growth. This growth is based in an 
intensification of production through practices outlined in the previous section. These practices 
can be readily understood as components integrated into a single vision of agrarian 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ%XWZLWKLQFDSLWDOLVPWKLVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVERWKµGLUW\¶DQGSURWracted and, 
when observed in real time rather than in retrospect, it is far from certain that it will succeed. 
Rwanda has a long way to go. 
 
:HFDQPDNHVRPHEURDGREVHUYDWLRQVDERXW5ZDQGD¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZKLFKRIIHUVXJJHVWLRQV
about the prospects of its transformation. At present, Rwandan peasantry is not generating strong 
class-based social movements. This is hardly surprising bearing in mind both the extended 
traumas and insecurities of the last thirty years and the authoritarian nature of state power. 
Rwandan peasants are not immanently docile; the historical circumstances with which they live 
simply make it extremely difficult and even dangerous to mobilize collective political action. It 
PLJKWEHQRUPDWLYHO\SOHDVLQJWRLGHQWLI\DQGFHOHEUDWHWKHµZHDSRQVRIWKHZHDN¶WKDWSHDVDQWV
might exercise to resist state power through micropolitical subterfuge (Thompson, 2013), but this 
kind of resistance does not contest the nature of the development strategy nor modify the terms 
upon which labour and accumulation take place. It is also the case that critical discussions of 
5ZDQGDQDJULFXOWXUHDUHQRWYHU\VWURQJZKHQIDFHGZLWKWKHµFRQYLQFLQJFRXQWHUIDFWXDO¶
question posed at the start of the article.  
 
Indeed, there are few clear statements about what a different but historically and politically 
proximate counterfactual might look like. Newbury (2011: 224) offers a comment on a 
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FRQVXOWDWLYHDSSURDFKJLYLQJµUHDOYRLFHWRWKHFRQFHUQVRIGLYHUVHFRQVWLWXHQFLHVLQFOXGLQJ
UXUDOSURGXFHUV¶)XUWKHUVSHFLILFDWion is not offered, and this comment seems, prima facie, 
GLIILFXOWWRUHFRQFLOHZLWK5ZDQGD¶VSROLWLFDOVLWXDWLRQ$QVRPVHWDO(2014: 181) argue that 
5ZDQGD¶VDJULFXOWXUDOVWUDWHJ\VKRXOGEHµEURDG-EDVHG¶DQGµIRXQGHGRQVPDOO-scale agricultural 
activity¶; but subsequently and tellingly the analysis broadens out to general features of sub-
Saharan African peasant agriculture, some of which ² for example the provision of small-scale 
credit and market connections ² PDNHPRVWVHQVHLQWKHODUJHUDQGPRUHµH[WHQVLYH¶
DJULFXOWXUHVRIWKHFRQWLQHQWUDWKHUWKDQLQ5ZDQGD¶VH[FHSWLRQDOO\GHQVHDQGIUDJPHQWHG
IDUPLQJODQGVFDSH'DZVRQHWDO¶VDVWXWHVWXG\RI5ZDQGD¶VYHUVLRQRIWKH*UHHQ5HYROXWLRQ
follows the same mode of argument: having made some careful judgements about the 
DXWKRULWDULDQDQGXQHTXDOHIIHFWVRI5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQWUDQVLWLRQDQµLQGXFHGLQQRYDWLRQ¶
alternative is posed in the briefest sense and in a way that does not address the major challenges 
that ² for better or worse ² the current model addresses (Dawson et al., 2014: 215). These 
critical approaches which emphasize the rights-GHQ\LQJIDFHWVRI5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQ
transformation at best infer a counterfactual, often without returning to the core challenges 
within the realiWLHVRI5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQTXHVWLRQ7DNHQDVDVLQJOHDOWHUQDWLYHYLVLRQWKH\UHIHU
WRDVRFLDOSURFHVVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\LQFUHPHQWDOµRUJDQLF¶DQGFRQVHQVXDOSROLF\ making based 
in an affirmation of current tenure and production relations. It is hard to see how this approach 
² in spite of its clear normative and rights-congruent appeal ² would address the absolute 
scarcity of land for many, the precariousness of agricultural production in light of population 
pressure and climatic change, and the general aQGSHUVLVWHQWORZSURGXFWLYLW\RI5ZDQGD¶V
agriculture compared with its neighbours.  
 
In summary, there is little evidence of social mobilization within the peasantry or of clear and 
GHWDLOHGDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKHVWR5ZDQGD¶VDJUDULDQTXHVWLRQ,QOLJKWof the facts of poverty, 
ODQGVFDUFLW\DQGVRFLDOWHQVLRQVWKDW5ZDQGD¶VUXUDOVRFLHW\FRQWDLQVGRLQJQRWKLQJRUDOORZLQJ
a thousand flowers to bloom in their own good time seems, if anything, less progressive and 
more politically risky. It is within this context that we can recognize why GoR is heavily 
involved in peasant agriculture. To date, this involvement massively outweighs the private 
commercial involvement that is supposed to drive the transformation of Rwandan agriculture.27 
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 Successive PSTAs give more emphasis to the role of the private sector ² none more so than PSTA3. 
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)RUVRPHWKLVµRYHUEDODQFH¶WRZDUGVWKHVWDWHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHPDUNHW-based strategy is in 
essence a means to project state power (Mann and Berry, 2016). It certainly does not yet 
represent a sustained and expanded accumulation based in the social relations of class and social 
differentiation, although nor does it preclude it.  
 
5ZDQGD¶VVOHQGHUKRSHRIGHYHORSPHQWDOVXFFHVVPLJKWUHYROYHDURXQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKLQ
WKHQH[WWZHQW\\HDUVLWHODERUDWHVDµ9LVLRQ¶JURXQGHGLQDVKLIWIURPVWDWH-dominated 
social engineering towards more socially embedded forms of accumulation in agriculture, forms 
which will very likely evoke deeper levels of social mobilization and, as a result, less political 
certainty and less of an ability to imagine the future of agriculture through the meeting of targets. 
It is perhaps in this sense that, especially for the next generation, political agency in Rwanda 
matters for development. 
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